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This research explores how investment and financing decisions influence R&D activities. 
According to conventional investment theory, investment decisions represent which 
assets to buy or how much to invest, while financing decisions represent how to pay for 
them. 
Although many studies of investment targets have been carried out, studies of 
investment amount are scarce because of measurement difficulties. Further, even though 
the optimal level of R&D investment (or saturation level in this study) was recently 
measured, the time lag between investment and performance was not considered. In 
addition to saturation level, critical mass, namely the minimum amount of effort 
necessary to increase returns on R&D investment, is another component of R&D 
investment decisions. However, again, the empirical measurement of the critical mass has 
thus far not been achieved.  
iv 
 
With respect to R&D financing decisions, many studies have pointed out that highly 
leveraged firms tend to reduce R&D investment. However, recent studies have also 
explained that the relationship between debt and R&D investment can differ according to 
technological intensity or debt type. In particular, loan or relational debt is positively 
related to R&D investment and performance because loans unlike bonds are better suited 
to governing asset specificity, uncertainty, and appropriability of R&D investment. 
However, previous studies of the relationship between loans and R&D have not 
considered loan maturity, technological intensity, or business cycle, which also 
significantly influence this relationship. 
Thus, this study first empirically measures the critical mass and saturation levels of 
R&D investment in small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises, which are 
increasingly attracting the attention of scholars and policymakers because of their 
expanding role in advancing technological progress through R&D. Using cross-section 
threshold estimation, this study estimates two values, which differ in terms of R&D 
performance and technological intensity. When using patent applications as a proxy of 
performance, we find that there are critical mass levels for R&D intensity and 
expenditure in high-tech industries but not in low-tech industries. This is because critical 
mass can exist in high-tech industries because of high technological entry barriers and 
high uncertainty. In the case of profit performance, only a saturation level exists.  
Second, this study investigates how loan ratio in terms of loan maturity, technological 
intensity, and business cycle influences R&D activity in small and medium-sized 
manufacturing enterprises. It finds that R&D intensity is positively correlated with the 
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long-term loan ratio and negatively with the short-term loan ratio. Further, an increase in 
the short-term loan ratio depresses R&D investment, especially in high-tech industries 
and during periods of economic downturn. 
Third, this study suggests policies and strategies to enhance the performance and 
efficiency of R&D investment for small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises. 
For high-tech firms below the critical mass, attaining critical mass by increasing R&D 
financing through long-term loan can be a good choice. In the long run, alternatives such 
as equity need to be considered. 
In summary, this research shows how R&D investment decisions affect R&D 
performance by measuring the critical mass and saturation levels in small and medium-
sized manufacturing firms as well as how financing decisions about capital structure  
influence R&D investment. Moreover, it suggests a composite decision to increase R&D 
performance and efficiency based on the results. 
 
Keywords: R&D Investment, Small and medium sized enterprises, Technological 
intensity, Critical mass, Saturation level, Loan maturity 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background 
 
Innovation is the key element of the knowledge base, growth, productivity, and 
competitiveness of an economy (Lee, 2011), and R&D is the major source of innovation 
and technical change (Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al., 2010). Therefore, R&D 
investment is crucial for both firms and the government. Conventional investment theory 
suggests that R&D investment is based on two important decisions, namely which assets 
to buy or how much to invest (i.e., an investment decision) and how to pay for them (i.e., 
a financing decision). 
Although research on R&D investment targets has been performed, previous studies 
of how much to invest are scarce because of the measurement complexity. In order to 
measure the degree of investment into R&D, two levels should be considered: the optimal 
level (or saturation level in this study) of R&D investment and the critical mass level. The 
former has long been a research subject and methods for its measurement exist 
theoretically (David et al., 2000; Howe and McFetridge, 1976). For example, Yeh et al. 
(2010) estimate the saturation level using a threshold regression model but they do not 
consider the time lag of R&D intensity. 
By contrast, although the possibility of measuring the critical mass level has been 
mentioned in previous research (Grabowski and Mueller, 1978; Galbraith, 1993; 
Sterlacchini, 2008), few empirical papers have suggested concrete measurement 
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approaches. Critical mass is recognized in the business and economics literature, where 
the terms “economies of scale,” “entry barrier,” “breakeven point,” “threshold effect,” or 
“the S-Curve” are more often used (Terpstra, 1983). It usually indicates that some 
minimum amount of effort or resources must be applied before any impact or output can 
be realized. Similarly, critical mass in R&D investment decisions indicates that a 
minimum amount of effort or resources is required in order to increase R&D performance 
rapidly from such an investment. 
Estimated critical mass and saturation levels are important for guiding R&D 
investment policy for governments and corporate strategies for firms. Indeed, 
policymakers and managers use critical mass and saturation levels in order to plan R&D 
investment and thus enhance the efficiency of R&D resources. Specifically, they can 
calculate the deficient amount of R&D investment from the critical mass level and find 
additional financial sources. 
With respect to R&D financing decisions, loans are the crucial source of external 
financing in many countries such as Japan, Germany and France (David et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, loans are an effective financing solution for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), especially because most SMEs are owner-managed and owners often 
have strong incentives to issue external debt rather than external equity in order to retain 
ownership and control of their firms (Berger and Udell, 1998). In Korea, over 70% of 
external funding for SMEs is provided through loans, while governments also support 
R&D investment through loans. SMEs can borrow long-term loans for R&D investment 
directly from the government or from banks after receiving guarantees. 
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Despite the usefulness and importance of loan or relational debt, many previous 
studies have pointed out that a higher debt ratio reduces R&D investment (Balakrishnan 
and Fox, 1993; Bradley et al., 1984; Hall, 1992; Kochhar, 1996; Simerly and Li, 2000; 
Singh, 2005; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Vincente-Lorente, 2001). The asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and appropriability of R&D investment all make lenders of debt reluctant to 
fund specific investments with poor collateral. In addition, highly leveraged firms are also 
reluctant to invest into R&D because the heavy pressure to repay existing loans can 
disrupt the continuity of R&D investment. This implies that the capital structure of a firm 
affects its R&D activity. 
Few scholars that have considered debt heterogeneity or technological intensity have 
found a positive relation between loan ratio and R&D investment. According to David et 
al. (2008), relational debt provided through bank loans can positively influence R&D 
investment compared with transactional debt generated through a bond issue, as it 
provides a lender with the soft governance appropriate for a borrower to invest in R&D in 
contrast to the strict contractual constraints of transactional debt. Chiao (2002) points out 
that industrial characteristics, especially whether firms operate in science or non-science 
industries, affect investments in different ways. In other words, heterogeneous 
characteristics of debt and industry produce different results. However, this in-depth 
research is at an early stage, and many research areas remain largely untapped. In 
particular, analysis related to classifying firms into high-tech and low-tech (i.e., 
technological intensity), to loan maturity, which is an important factor for loan financing, 




Finally, combined with the results provided by threshold estimation, managers and 
policymakers can establish appropriate strategies or policies for R&D investment and 
financing. Moreover, this study can contribute to existent research into R&D investment 
and financing by investigating how to measure critical mass and saturation levels and 
exploring how loan ratio in terms of technological intensity, loan maturity, and business 
cycle affects R&D activity. 
 
 
1.2 Research objective 
 
SMEs are increasingly attracting the attention of scholars and policymakers because of 
their crucial contributions to technological progress through R&D and innovation 
(Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011). In Korea, the government makes an effort to support 
the R&D activities of SMEs. Thus, this study focuses on R&D activities of manufacturing 
SMEs. 
First, it measures the critical mass and saturation levels of R&D investment using 
cross-section threshold estimation, which is used to guide decisions on how much to 
invest. It then separately analyzes high-tech and low-tech firms in terms of their R&D 
intensity, R&D human resources, R&D expenditure (as a proxy for R&D investment), 
and number of patent applications and gross profit ratio (as a proxy for R&D 
performance). Based on the results, implications to increase R&D performance and 
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efficiency are suggested. 
Second, this study investigates how loan ratio in terms of technological intensity, loan 
maturity, and business cycle affects R&D activity, which is related to financing decisions, 
namely how to pay. This study analyzes each relationship individually and then suggests 
an overarching framework for capital structure and R&D intensity.  
Third, this study suggests policy and strategy to enhance the performance of R&D 
investment for manufacturing SMEs including analyzing the relationship between loan 








1.3 Structure of the study 
 
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 reviews investment and financing 
decisions for R&D. Since the research area of R&D investment is extensive, issues on 
how much to invest and how to pay are in focus, and the relevant issues related to the 
empirical analysis are also reviewed. In Chapter 3, the critical mass and saturation levels 
are investigated using a cross-section threshold regression model. Based on the presented 
results, implications and limitations are then discussed. Chapter 4 presents the 
relationship between loan ratio (as a proxy for capital structure) and R&D intensity (as a 
proxy for R&D investment). Finally, the empirical results are summarized and policy and 







Chapter 2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1 Review of R&D investment 
 
2.1.1 R&D and innovation outcome 
 
R&D is the main factor behind innovation and technical change (Moncada-Paternò-
Castello et al., 2010). Many previous papers have found a relationship between R&D and 
innovation. For example, Mairesse and Mohnen (2004) assess the impact of R&D on 
innovation separately for high-tech and low-tech industries and find that R&D investment 
is positively correlated with process innovation, new product innovation (both new to the 
firm and new to the market), patent applications, and patent holdings. 
The OECD defines R&D as creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order 
to increase the stock of knowledge, including individual, cultural, and societal knowledge, 
and its use to devise new applications. According to Hall et al. (2009), R&D is classified 
into basic research, applied research, and development, depending on how close the 
research is to commercial application. In general, the closer it is, the larger is the size of 
investment. Similarly, a distinction can be made between R&D directed towards the 
invention of new methods of production (“process R&D”) and that towards the creation 
of new and improved goods (“product R&D”). R&D can also be classified based on its 
funding source (i.e., private or public) or whether it is carried out by businesses or by 
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other organizations such as universities and research institutes. In addition, based on the 
proportion of R&D devoted to research, it can be divided into scientific and technical 
fields. Furthermore, the industry can be labeled as high-tech and low-tech (“technological 
intensity”) based on dividing R&D expenditure by value added and by production 
(Criscuolo and Martin, 2004). 
 
2.1.2 Economic characteristics of R&D investment 
 
Brealey et al. (2001) state that a company must (i) satisfy its customers in order to survive 
and prosper and (ii) produce and sell products and services at a profit. In order to produce, 
it needs many assets, such as a plant, equipment, offices, computers, and technology. 
Thus, the company has to decide (i) which assets to buy (or how much to buy) and (ii) 
how to pay for them. The former decision, termed the investment decision, relates to 
investing in assets such as a plant, equipment, and know-how, whereas the latter decision, 
termed the financing decision, is the choice of how to pay for such investments.  
According to Hall and Lerner (2009), the primary output of R&D investment is the 
knowledge of how to create new goods and services; this knowledge is non-rival, which 
means that the firm does not monopolize its output. If knowledge cannot be kept secret, 
returns cannot be appropriated by the firm, and it will thus be reluctant to invest, leading 
to underinvestment in R&D. By contrast, the positive externalities derived from R&D 
include a social return that is higher than the private level (Griliches, 1991). Further, 
Romer (1986) uses endogenous macroeconomic growth models to suggest that one 
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person’s use of knowledge does not diminish its utility to another person. These positive 
externalities justify policymakers’ interventions using intellectual property systems, 
government support of R&D, R&D tax incentives, and the encouragement of research 
partnerships (Hall and Lerner, 2009). 
Hall and Lerner (2009) also claim that R&D has different characteristics compared 
with ordinary investment. First, the high proportion of wages and salaries for highly 
educated scientists and engineers create an intangible asset, namely the firm’s knowledge 
base, from which profits in future years will be generated. Thus, knowledge from R&D 
investment is tacit and embedded in the human capital of the firm’s employees.  
Second, the high level of uncertainty associated with its output tends to be greatest at 
the beginning of a research program or project, which means that an optimal R&D 
investment strategy has an options-like character. This suggests that R&D projects that 
have low probabilities of great success in the future may be worth continuing even if they 










2.1.3 Research topics in R&D investment 
 
The major issues about R&D investment, based on previous studies, are summarized in 
Figure 2. These issues can be concluded in two questions. First, what is the relation 
between R&D investment and performance? Second, how can we improve performance 
from R&D investment? The background of the first question is that innovation and R&D 
investment are expensive and thus a positive return is desirable in the future (Hall et al., 









According to Del Monte and Papagni (2003), there are three relationships between 
R&D investment and performance: positive, none, and negative. Table 1 shows that these 
relationships dependent on R&D investment and performance. Although the majority of 
papers show a positive relationship, the purpose of elucidating zero or negative 
relationships is to improve R&D investment in the future. 
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The R&D paradox as the non-positive relationship between R&D investment and 
performance means that R&D performance does not increase in line with R&D 
investment. Ejermo et al. (2011) suggest three reasons for this paradox. The first is 
malfunctioning national innovation systems. The second is the natural consequence of 
diminishing returns on increasing R&D investment. The third is that these phenomena 
may co-exist. Meanwhile, Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al. (2010) find that the lower 
corporate R&D intensity in the EU is the result of sector specialization and the smaller 
population of R&D-investing firms within these sectors. 
For the second question, many papers have discussed the determinants of better R&D 
performance following investment. Although there are several main agents for R&D 
investment, the representative one is firm, which can be subdivided into external and 
internal determinants. External determinants include policy (David et al., 2000), 
institutions including innovation systems (Moncada-Paternò-Castello et al., 2010; Ejermo 
et al., 2011), carbon emissions (Garrone and Grilli, 2010), privatization (Munari et al., 
2002), technological intensity (Chiao, 2002; Carpenter and Peterson, 2002; Nunes et al., 
2012), business cycle (Saint-Paul, 1993; Ouyang, 2011), and market structure (Griffiths 
and Webster, 2010; Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck, 2010). Internal determinants include 
firm size; ownership (Griffiths and Webster, 2010; Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009; Munari et 
al., 2010; Ghosh et al., 2007); organizational structure (Christensen, 2002); location, 
which is related to regional innovation systems with spillover (Lee, 2009; Hewitt-Dundas 
and Roper, 2011) and the internalization of multinational firms (Guadalupe et al., 2010; 
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Negassi, 2004); and management strategy such as cooperation (De Marchi, 2012; Kloyer 
and Scholderer, 2012), which is a general issue in R&D investment. 
However, although many issues are studied in R&D investment, most of them analyze 
qualitatively. Previous literatures including Dosi et al. (2006) indicate that the reason of 
R&D paradox in Europe is underinvestment, but they don’t refer how much R&D 
investment is insufficient. On the other hand, R&D expenditure is increasing in 
developed and developing countries (Figure 3). However, increasing R&D expenditure 
which may be overinvestment, is not always the best policy (Hartmann et al., 2006). In 
order to determine underinvestment or overinvestment, measuring proper amount of 
R&D investment has to be preceded.   
 
 




In addition, many scholars have indicated that a higher debt ratio reduces R&D 
investment (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Bradley et al., 1984; Hall, 1992; Kochhar, 1996; 
Simerly and Li, 2000; Singh and Faircloth, 2005; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Vincente-
Lorente, 2001), whereas others have argued for a positive relation between debt and R&D 
investment (Chaio, 2002; David et al., 2008; Wang and Thornhill, 2010). In-depth 
research about relationship between debt and R&D investment is at an early stage, and 
many researches have to perform.  
 
 
2.2 Literature reviews 
 
2.2.1 Relevant issues with empirical analysis 
 
Important determinants for this research include public subsidies, technological intensity, 
and firm size. First, David et al.’s (2000) review suggests that several studies have found 
a complementarity between public and private R&D investments. Specifically, since a tax 
credit directly reduces the marginal cost of R&D, one would not expect to see “crowding 
out” effects on industrial R&D. Therefore, when firms expand their R&D activities 
through tax offsets against profits, they are likely to select projects that will generate 
greater profits in the short-term. Ultimately, projects that have high social rates of return 
and long-term projects may be less favored by the expansion of private funding. The 
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direct funding of R&D programs by the government allows public R&D subsidies to be 
targeted towards projects that offer high marginal social rates of return. This funding can 
thus be concentrated in areas where there is a large gap between the social and the private 
rates of return. Such increased government funding for industrial R&D projects is thus 
likely to reduce firms’ R&D investments. 
By contrast, four reasons could stimulate complementary private R&D expenditures 
in the short run: (i) public R&D contracts increase the efficiency of the firm’s R&D by 
lowering common costs or increasing absorptive capacity; (ii) they signal future demand; 
(iii) they may improve the chances of the firm’s other projects succeeding; and (iv) they 
allow firms to overcome fixed R&D startup costs. In summary, both micro- and macro-
level studies tend to show a complementarity between public and private R&D 
investments (David et al., 2000). 
Moving onto technological intensity, Kamien and Schwartz (1974) refer to partial 
ignorance as technological uncertainty and market uncertainty. Moreover, Carpenter and 
Peterson (2002) suggest three reasons why high-tech investment is particularly likely to 
be affected by capital market imperfections. First, the returns on high-tech investments 
are highly uncertain because R&D projects have a low probability of financial success. 
Second, information asymmetries are likely to exist between firms and potential investors 
(i.e., insiders will have more information than outsiders about their projects). Third, R&D 
investment in high-tech firms has little value in the event of failure. Physical investment 
for R&D is likely to be firm-specific and have little collateral value.  
Chiao (2002) finds that the high marginal costs of debt discourage firms in science-
16 
 
based industries compared with those in non-science-based industries from borrowing to 
finance R&D. Meanwhile, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) state that R&D projects can 
differ substantially in terms of the uncertainty of their returns, resource requirements, risk 
of failure, involvement of basic research, and the importance of secrecy and suggest that 
these properties may affect financing conditions. Nunes et al. (2012) find that many 
factors may contribute to R&D investment in high-tech SMEs compared with non-high-
tech SMEs. These factors include: (i) the product’s shorter life cycle and high cost of 
R&D investment diminish competition and create a need to diversify activities; (ii) 
continuous, rather than occasional, investment by high-tech SMEs may cultivate more 
efficient strategies for leading and managing corporate R&D projects; (iii) more highly 
qualified human resources may be a determinant of the more efficient management of 
R&D projects; (iv) greater absorptive capacity may promote the more effective use of 
good management practices in R&D projects; and (v) greater capacity to implement 
cooperation strategies with similar firms may allow firms to acquire experience 
benchmarks in R&D project management. 
Concerning firm size, according to Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011), the role of SMEs 
is increasingly attracting the attention of scholars and policymakers because of their 
crucial contributions to technological progress through R&D and innovation. Hoffman et 
al. (1998) suggest that SMEs are more likely to involve product innovation than process 
innovation. Further, they are heavily focused on producing products for niche markets 
rather than mass markets, more frequently organized formally within larger SMEs, and 
tend to be more ad-hoc or project-driven in smaller SMEs. Nunes et al. (2012) present 
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that SMEs face additional difficulties in managing R&D projects that require qualified 
human resources and efficient management of technology and information. Ortega-
Argilés et al. (2009) comment that SMEs face financial constraints in R&D investment. 
Finally, Berger and Udell (1998) argue that the degree of informational opacity is a key 
feature that drives the financial growth cycle and that distinguishes small business finance 
from large business finance. Furthermore, they show where differently sized firms lie on 
a size/age/information continuum (see Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Firm continuum and sources of finance, Source: Berger and Udell (1998) 
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2.2.2 Thresholds of R&D investment 
 
Although previous studies of R&D investment decisions that explore which R&D assets 
to buy are common, those that assess how much to invest are relatively scarce. The real 
option method is generally used in order to select R&D assets. By valuing real R&D 
options, firms can select R&D projects and buy R&D assets (Paxson, 2003). However, 
measuring the level of R&D investment is very complicated (Howe and McFetridge, 
1976). 
On measuring the level of R&D investment, two levels are main concerns. The one is 
the optimal level or saturation level of R&D investment and the other is the critical mass 
level. Previous studies have considered the saturation value of R&D resources (David et 
al., 2000; Howe and McFetridge, 1976). Howe and McFetridge (1976) propose a 
framework for R&D funding decisions based on firm-level investment behavior. Their 
equation of the framework can be viewed as a reduced form of the structure that describes 
the R&D decision-making process of a profit-maximizing firm. Investment in R&D can 
be assumed to proceed to the point at which the marginal rate of return (MRR) on R&D is 
equal to the marginal cost of funds (MCF): 
 
MRRR = f1 (R, C1) 
 
MCF = f2 (R, C2) 
 
where R is the R&D expenditure of the firm and C1 and C2 are vectors of the shift 
19 
 
variables of the MRR and MCF schedules, respectively. Profit maximization implies that 
R&D investment proceeds to the point (R*) at which MRRR = MCF (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between MCF and MRR, Source: David et al. (2000) 
 
According to David et al. (2000), the C1 variables reflect: (i) technological intensity, 
which governs the ease with which it is possible to generate innovations relevant to the 
firm’s market area; (ii) demand status in the potential market area; and (iii) the 
institutional and other conditions that affect the appropriability of innovation benefits. 
Correspondingly, the C2 variables include: (i) technology policy, which affects the private 
cost of R&D projects such as the tax treatment of that class of investment, R&D subsidies, 
and the cost-sharing programs of government procurement agencies; (ii) the 
macroeconomic conditions and expectations that affect the internal cost of funds with the 
general state of price/earnings ratios in equity markets; (iii) the bond market conditions 
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that affect the external cost of funds; and (iv) the availability and terms of venture capital 
finance, as influenced by institutional conditions such as the development of IPO markets 
and the tax treatment of capital gains. 
Meanwhile, previous research has only discussed the existence of the critical mass 
level in R&D investment. For instance, Grabowski and Mueller (1978) mention that 
significant critical mass may be necessary for R&D projects to be carried out efficiently, 
while Galbraith (1993) argues that R&D is subject to minimum project sizes in order to 
generate useful results because of technical indivisibilities, while Sterlacchini (2008) 
insists that attaining the critical mass is crucial insofar as there are increasing returns from 
R&D. 
 
2.2.3 External financing of R&D investment 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that a firm that chooses the optimal levels of 
investment should be indifferent to its capital structure and should face the same price for 
investment and R&D investment on the margin. However, their opinion is controversial 
and it might not hold for the following reasons: (i) the uncertainty related to incomplete 
markets may make a real options approach to the R&D investment decision more 
appropriate; (ii) the cost of capital may differ by source of funds for non-tax and tax 
reasons; and (iii) the cost of capital may differ across types of investments for both tax 
and other reasons (Hall and Lerner, 2009).  
According to Hall (2002) and Hall and Lerner (2009), there might be a gap between 
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the external and internal costs of capital because of asymmetric information between 
inventor/entrepreneur and investor, and moral hazard on the part of the 
inventor/entrepreneur arising from the separation of ownership and management.  
The asymmetric information problem means that an inventor frequently has better 
information about the probability of success and the nature of the contemplated R&D 
investment compared with potential investors. Thus, the “lemons premium” (Akerlof, 
1970) for R&D will be higher than that for ordinary investments, because investors have 
more difficulty distinguishing good projects from bad when projects are long-term 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977). According to Leland and Pyle (1977), two problems hamper 
firms that sell information directly to investors, namely the appropriability of returns by 
the firm and the credibility of selling information. It may thus be difficult or even 
impossible for potential users to distinguish between good and bad information. When the 
level of R&D expenditure is highly observable, the lemons problem is somewhat 
mitigated, but certainly not eliminated. 
Reducing information asymmetry through fuller disclosure is partially effective 
because of the ease of the imitation of inventive ideas. Firms avoid revealing their 
innovative ideas to the market because of the associated heavy cost and lost competitive 
advantage. Therefore, firms and inventors face higher costs of external compared with 
internal capital for R&D because of the lemons premium. 
With respect to asymmetric information, David et al. (2008) insist that because 
relational debt is private and does not require public information disclosure, this limits the 
appropriation of proprietary knowledge from R&D by competitors. From this point of 
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view, debt heterogeneity can affect the relationship between debt and R&D investment in 
different ways. 
Moral hazard in R&D investment frequently arises, since firms typically separate 
ownership and management. Moral hazard can arise in two cases. The first one is the 
tendency of managers to spend on activities that benefit them and the second is the 
reluctance of risk-averse managers to invest in uncertain R&D projects. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the sum of the monitoring expenditures incurred 
by the principal, the bonding expenditures incurred by the agent, and the residual loss. In 
their opinion, agency costs of the first type can be avoided by reducing the amount of free 
cash flow available to managers by leveraging. However, firms have to use higher-cost 
external funds in order to finance R&D. In the second scenario, if bankruptcy risk 
increases, both managers and potential bondholders may avoid highly uncertain projects 
that shareholders would like to undertake. The solution to this second type of agency cost 
would be to increase the long-term incentives faced by the manager. Although debt may 
be a useful tool for reducing agency costs in the firm, its effectiveness is limited because 
the knowledge generated by the R&D investment shows specificity and appropriability. 
Therefore, debtholders prefer to use physical assets to secure loans and are reluctant to 
lend for R&D investment. Indeed, Opler and Titman (1994) find that highly leveraged 
firms that engage in R&D suffer the most in economically distressed periods. 
However, the moral hazard problem will be diminished for SMEs because the 
managers and owners are often the same. Furthermore, according to David et al. (2008), 
the low liquidation asset value of R&D investment is not a serious problem for relational 
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lenders, as they can be forbearing and help the firm through liquidity problems, thus 
preserving the value of such investments. In particular, when the government guarantees 











This research investigates two threshold values, the critical mass and saturation levels of 
R&D investment (Figure 6). The measurement of critical mass, which requires a 
minimum amount of effort or resources to increase R&D performance, and saturation 
level, which decreases the growth rate of R&D performance, can offer basic facts and 
implications about R&D policy and strategy. 
Although threshold value is a subject of scholarly attention in many areas of social 
science research, there has been little focus on this field in R&D investment research. In 
particular, although the concept and importance of critical mass for R&D investment have 
been referred to in previous studies (Galbraith, 1993; Grabowski and Mueller, 1978; 
Sterlacchini, 2008), a concrete measure of critical mass is unchartered territory. 
Meanwhile, although Yeh et al. (2010) estimate the optimal level for R&D, which is 
similar with saturation level, they do not consider the time lag between investment and 
performance, which is a crucial factor for the analysis of R&D investment. 
This study thus empirically measures the critical mass and saturation levels for R&D 
investment using the threshold estimation model proposed by Hansen (2000). I find that 
there are critical mass levels for R&D intensity and expenditure in high-tech industries 
when R&D performance is a number of patent, but not in low-tech industries because of 
their contrasting characteristics. Critical mass exists in high-tech industries because of the 
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prevailing high technological entry barriers and high uncertainty. When R&D 
performance is a gross profit ratio, there are only saturation levels in both high-tech and 
low-tech industries because there are more considerations related to profit such as 
business cycle and marketing strategies. I thus show that the threshold values in R&D 
investment are different by technological intensity and R&D performance. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the literatures regarding 
critical mass and saturation level. Section 3 suggests the empirical model consisting of 
econometric specifications and data description. Section 4 interprets the results, and the 











Figure 6. The concept of critical mass and saturation level 
R&D investment 
(R&D intensity,  
R&D human resources,  
R&D expenditure) 
R&D Performance 





3.2 Literature reviews 
 
3.2.1 Critical mass of R&D investment 
 
In its original form, critical mass represents Heisenberg's informal estimate of the amount 
of uranium required (or threshold) for the atomic bomb (Logan, 1996). However, in the 
present context, it is also recognized in business and economics as a synonym for 
“economies of scale,” “entry barrier,” “breakeven point,” “threshold effect” and “the S-
Curve” (Terpstra, 1983). In social science, Rogers (2003) uses critical mass to describe 
the existence of a sufficient amount of adopters of an innovation in a social system such 
that the rate of adoption becomes self-sustaining and creates further growth. At this point, 
critical mass defines the point at which the early adopter stage becomes the early majority 
stage. In this regard, the analysis of the time to reach the critical mass is important, as this 
is related to the point of inflection in the relationship between the cumulative number of 
innovation adopters and time.  
Meanwhile, although previous research has discussed the existence and the 
importance of critical mass in R&D investment, few papers have suggested a concrete 
measure. Grabowski and Mueller (1978) mention that significant critical mass may be 
necessary for R&D projects to be carried out efficiently, while Galbraith (1993) argues 
that a minimum level of R&D investment is necessary to generate useful results because 
of technical indivisibilities. Sterlacchini (2008) insists that attaining the critical mass is 
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crucial insofar as there are increasing returns from R&D.  
The reason that critical mass which is a synonym for “entry barrier” exists is   
technological entry barrier in knowledge and scale that may be represented by high 
expenditure (Orr, 1974). The technological entry barrier is different in technological 
intensities and it in high-tech industries is generally higher than that in low-tech 
industries (Marsili, 2002). The fiercer competition in high-tech industries (Agarwal, 1998) 
can increase the strength of entry barrier. Even though technological entry barrier doesn’t 
exist, critical mass can exist because of uncertainty in R&D investment. Because 
achieving a R&D performance to overcome uncertainty requires a high cost or critical 
mass. Therefore, as high-tech industries show a higher level of uncertainty (Hall and 
Lerner, 2009) and a higher technological entry barrier, critical mass level in low-tech 
industries may be lower than that in high-tech industries or not measurable because it is 
very low. Finally, the existence of critical mass can different in R&D performances. In 
particular, critical mass may not exist when R&D performance is profitability because 
entry barrier may not have a strong effect on profitability (Wu, 2009). Furthermore, 
profitability is also affected by business cycle and marketing strategy as well as R&D 
investment. 
 
3.2.2 Saturation level of R&D investment 
 
Although previous studies resources (David et al., 2000; Howe and McFetridge, 1976; 
Huang and Liu, 2005; Yeh et al., 2010) refer to the optimal value of R&D investment, 
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these adopt various R&D performance indices to estimate the optimal level. Since R&D 
investment has a positive spillover effect, other elements of R&D performance will also 
increase in parallel even if investment in R&D exceeds the optimal level. Therefore, this 
study uses the term “saturation level” instead of optimal level. 
Previous studies have considered the saturation value of R&D resources (David et al., 
2000; Howe and McFetridge, 1976). Howe and McFetridge (1976) propose a framework 
for R&D funding decisions based on firm-level investment behavior. Their equation of 
the framework can be viewed as a reduced form of the structure that describes the R&D 
decision-making process of a profit-maximizing firm. Investment in R&D can be 
assumed to proceed to the point at which the MRR on R&D is equal to the MCF. 
Performance maximization implies that R&D investment proceeds to the point at which 
MRR = MCF. 
Huang and Liu (2005) find that investment of innovation capital has a non-linear 
(inverted U-shaped) relationship with firm performance and estimate the saturation level 
using R&D investment squared term, while Yeh et al. (2010) estimates the saturation 
level of R&D intensity using the threshold regression model. However, Huang and Liu 
(2005) and Yeh et al. (2010) don’t consider the time lag that has the greatest impact on the 











Similar to the method used to assess innovation diffusion, threshold value can measured 
from the relationship between R&D performance and time. Hall (2005) analyzes the time 
when patenting explores in the US using a test for structural change of Zivot and Andrew 
(1992) and Andrew (1993). Rafferty (2008) elucidates the relationship between university 
R&D activities and the Bayh–Dole Act in the US using the same test as that adopted in 
Hall (2005). However, since this test for structural change is based on time-series analysis, 
it requires sufficient annual data. Therefore, data available over a short period are 
inappropriate for analysis. Further, because the method estimates the time at which R&D 
performance is rapidly changing, the point of structural change does not always mean the 
threshold value. 
The second method is the threshold estimation described by Hansen (2000). Equations 
(1) and (2) can be formally treated as a special case of the threshold regression model: 
 
gq £+= iiii qexy ,
'
1  ······································································ Eq. (1)  
gq >+= iiii qexy ,
'
2  ····································································· Eq. (2)  
 
where qi is the threshold variable that is used to divide the sample into two groups and g 
is the threshold value. The random variable ei is a regression error. Hansen’s (2000) 
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approach is to let 21 qqd -=n  denote the threshold effect and let 0®nd  as ¥®n . 
Further, he holds 1q  fixed and makes 2q  approach 1q  as ¥®n . This model allows 
the regression parameters to differ depending on the value of qi. To rewrite the model in a 
single equation, let us define )( g£iqI  where I() is the indicator function and set 
)()( gg £= iii qIxx . Thus, equations (1) and (2) now equal equation (3): 
 
iinii exxy ++= )(
''
2 gdq  ································································· Eq. (3)  
 
To express the model in matrix notation, we define the n*1 vectors Y and e by 
stacking the variables yi and ei, and the n*m matrices X and Xg by stacking the vectors 
'
ix  and )'(gix . Then, equation (3) can be written as: 
 
eXXY n ++= gdq  ········································································· Eq. (4)  
 
The regression parameters are ),,( gdq n , and the natural estimator is least squares 
(LS) estimator.  
Let 
 
)()'(),,( dqdqgdq gg XXYXXYSEn ----=  ······························ Eq. (5)  
 
be the function of the sum of squared errors. Then, by definition, the LS estimators 
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gdq ˆ,ˆ,ˆ jointly minimize equation (5). For this minimization, g is assumed to be restricted 
to a bounded set G=],[ gg . The computationally easiest method to obtain the LS 
estimates is through concentration. Conditional on g, equation (6) is linear in j and nd , 
yielding the OLS estimators )(ˆ gq  and )(ˆ gd  by regression of Y on ],[* gg XXX = . 
The concentrated sum of the squared errors function is
YXXXXYYYSS nn ')'('')),(
ˆ),(ˆ()( *1*** ggggggdgqg
--== , and ĝ is the value that 




= , where 
},...,{ 1 nn qqÇG=G , which requires less than n function evaluations.  











iqYXXX  ···················································· Eq. (7)  
 
The hypothesis of no threshold effect in (1) and (2) can be represented by the linear 
constraint 
 
H0: j1= j2 
 
Under H0, the threshold g is not identified, and thus classical tests have non-standard 
distributions. To solve this problem, Hansen (1996) suggests a bootstrap method to 
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1q  ················································································ Eq. (8)  
 
Under homoskedasticity, the test of H0 is based on the F-test, whereas under 
heteroskedasticity, the test of H0 is based on the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. 










1  and 
)}(),...,(),({ 21 kSSS ggg be the multivariate normal with mean zero and covariances 
))()(( lj SSE gg . The null distribution has a chi-squared distribution and thus the test 
takes the form 
 
 )'(),()'),()(
ˆ),(('),()()( 11111 gggggggggggg nnnnnnnn SRMRMVRMRMST
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1å == gg . 
Hansen (1996) shows that p-values constructed from the bootstrap are asymptotically 
                                         





For j=1,…, J (repeat time), execute the following steps: 
 










1å == gg (under heteroskedasticity) 










n TTJp 1 )}(max)({max)/1( gg  
 
Then, draw a sample of size n from the empirical distribution and use these errors to 
create a bootstrap sample under H0. Repeat this procedure many times and calculate the 
percentage of draws for which the simulated statistic exceeds the actual. The null of no 






                                         
2 According to Johnston and DiNardo (1997, pp. 366–367), this procedure is similar to “residual resampling,” 
which is the most common form of bootstrapping in time-series applications. For J, first draw a sample of 
size n with replacements from the set of rescaled residuals. Second, construct new dependent variables. Then, 





The R&D data used in this study were collected from the Survey of Research and 
Development in Korea (SRDK), which was first carried out in 1963. The purposes of the 
SRDK are to investigate annually R&D (in terms of human resources and expenditure) in 
Korea and to supply the basic data for national R&D policymaking and planning. These 
data are also used as OECD statistics on R&D activity. In addition, patent data were 
obtained from the Korea Institute of Patent Information. Financial data were mainly 
collected from Korea Enterprise Data and Korea Investors Service, which are leading 
corporate credit agencies in Korea. 
To investigate the critical mass and saturation levels of R&D investment, this study 
focuses on SMEs in the manufacturing sector that have a two-digit code between 10 and 
33 according to Korea’s Standard Industrial Classification (SIC2) in 2007. After omitting 
outliers based on the dependent and independent variables, the final sample contained 
2,748 SMEs.  
The OECD classifies technology and industry into the following four categories: 
high technology, medium-high technology, medium-low technology, and low technology. 
This classification is based on technological intensity indicators, namely R&D 
expenditures divided by value added and R&D expenditures divided by production in 
OECD countries (Criscuolo and Martin, 2004). Based on the above-described OECD 
classification, the total sample was divided into two categories, high-tech industries (n = 
2,226; represented by the high technology and medium-high technology categories and 
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including the chemical, pharmaceuticals, medical, electronics, machinery, and motor 
vehicle industries) and low-tech industries (n = 522; medium-low technology and low 
technology). Table 2 shows the number of SMEs by SIC2. 
 





20-Chemicals and chemical products 286 
21-Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations  97 
26-Computer, electronic and network products 621 
27-Medical, precision, optical and watch products 263 
28-Electrical equipment 268 
29-Machinery and equipment 493 
30-Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 163 
31-Other transport equipment  35 
Low-tech 
(522) 
10-Food products  70 
11-Beverages   5 
12-Tobacco products   1 
13-Textiles  47 
14-Wearing apparel  13 
15-Leather and related products   9 
16-Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture    3 
17-Paper and paper products   7 
18-Printing and reproduction of recorded media   6 
19-Coke and refined petroleum products   12 
22-Rubber and plastics products 104 
23-Other non-metallic mineral products  53 
24-Basic metals  53 
25-Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 117 
32-Furniture   6 





In the analysis, the number of patent applications (LNP) and gross profit ratio (GPR) 
were used as dependent variables. Even the successful completion of a scientific project 
such as a patent does not guarantee future profit (Ben-Zion, 1984). However, many 
papers have considered the generation of patents as the outcome of R&D, suggesting that 
applying patent statistics as a proxy of firm performance and R&D activities is relevant 
(Pavitt, 1985; Griliches, 1990; Kondo, 1999; Cohen et al., 2002; Iwasa and Odagiri, 2004; 
Beneito, 2006). Further, although previous papers have used return on assets or return on 
equity as proxies of R&D performance (Huang and Liu, 2005; Yeh et al., 2010), the ratio 
of gross profit to net sales to exclude the effect of depreciation and tax was used in this 
research. 
 The determinants of R&D performance in this study thus consist of the following 
five factors (see Table 3). As independent variables, there are three types of R&D 
investment, namely R&D intensity (RINT), R&D human resources (RHR), and R&D 
expenditure (REXP). RINT is calculated by dividing R&D expenditure by net sales 
(Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Hitt et al., 1991; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wang and 
Thornhill, 2010). RHR is the ratio of researchers to employees, while REXP is the total 
R&D expenditure including government policy funds (i.e., the R&D total item in the 
SRDK). R&D investments are lagged by two years for patents and by three years for 
profit ratio, because previous research has assumed a time lag between R&D input and 
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output (Hwang et al., 2009; Wang, 2007; Wang and Thornhill, 2010).3 The control 
variables include firm size (SIZE), which is measured by the logarithm of total assets, 
firm age (AGE) from inception, and the debt ratio of liabilities to total assets (DEBTR). 
The average ratio of operating income to total assets (IND) for the sample SMEs is 
reflected in the industrial characteristics.  
Tables 4 and 5 present the descriptive statistics for patents and profit ratio, 
respectively. R&D investment (i.e., RINT, RHR, and REXP) in high-tech industries is 
higher than that in low-tech industries, as is the total debt ratio. LNP and GPR as R&D 
performances in high-tech industries are higher than those in low-tech industries. 
Moreover, Tables 6 to 9 show that the bivariate correlations. DEBTR is negatively 
associated with LNP and GPR. SIZE and R&D investment are positively correlated with 










                                         
3 In general, firms apply for patents after finishing the R&D process. More time is spent on making a profit 




Table 3. Definition of variables 
Variables Definition 
Patent LNP Log10(number of patent application+ 1) 
Profit ratio GPR Gross profit / Net sales 
R&D investment 
RINT R&D total expenditure / Net sales 
L2RINT RINTt-2 
L3RINT RINTt-3 
RHR Researcher / Employee 
L2RHR RHRt-2 
L3RHR RHRt-3 
REXP Log10(R&D total expenditure (Unit:1,000 KRW)) 
L2REXP REXPt-2 
L3REXP REXPt-3 
Firm size SIZE Log10 (Total assets
a)  
Age AGE Establishment year – Year + 1 




Average of (Operating profit / Total assets) in 2 digit 
SIC 








Table 4. Descriptive statistics for patent 
Variables 
High-tech Low-tech 
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
LNP 1,195 0.279  0.346  318 0.212  0.312  
DEBTR 1,195 0.529  0.221  318 0.535  0.217  
SIZE 1,195 7.181  0.547  318 7.353  0.528  
AGE 1,195 1.086  0.282  318 1.199  0.287  
IND 1,195 0.041  0.017  318 0.047  0.013  
L2RINT 1,112 0.055  0.053  309 0.030  0.038  
L2RHR 1,195 0.205  0.182  318 0.113  0.124  
L2REXP 1,195 5.685  0.461  318 5.530  0.447  
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for profit ratio 
Variables 
High-tech Low-tech 
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
GPR 1,718 0.240  0.121  388 0.201  0.100  
DEBTR 1,718 0.535  0.213  388 0.545  0.213  
SIZE 1,718 7.003  0.535  388 7.147  0.532  
AGE 1,718 1.081  0.226  388 1.171  0.238  
IND 1,718 0.041  0.016  388 0.047  0.012  
L3RINT 1,554 0.069  0.064  370 0.044  0.054  
L3RHR 1,718 0.229  0.188  388 0.123  0.113  





Table 6. Bivariate correlation coefficients for patent in high-tech firmsa 




      






     








    










   












































a P-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 7. Bivariate correlation coefficients for patent in low-tech firmsa 




      






     








    










   
















































Table 8. Bivariate correlation coefficients for profit ratio in high-tech firmsa 




      






     








    










   












































a P-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 9. Bivariate correlation coefficients for profit ratio in low-tech firmsa 




      






     








    










   

















































Table 10 provides the results to the White test. This study uses the bootstrap method to 
approximate the LM test under heteroskedasticity and F-statistics under homoskedasticity. 
The White test shows that all errors in the models are heteroskedastic and thus this study 
employs the heteroskedasticity-consistent LM test to ascertain Hansen’s (1996) threshold. 
 






























0.000 0.000 0.000 0.082 0.001 0.049 
 
Tables 11 and 12 show the empirical results when R&D performance is defined as the 
number of patent applications by high-tech firms and low-tech firms, respectively. Tables 
13 and 14 show the same empirical results when R&D performance is proxied by gross 
profit ratio. The p-values for the LM statistics are derived from repeating the bootstrap 
procedures 1,000 times for each of the bootstrap tests and the values are found to be 













Estimated threshold 0.014 - 5.477 
Critical mass/saturation level Critical mass - Critical mass 
Variable 
Below threshold Over threshold Below threshold Over threshold Below threshold Over threshold 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
R&D investment 1.716  4.811  0.671*** 0.251  
    
-0.026  0.045  0.212*** 0.049  
SIZE 0.072* 0.043  0.218*** 0.029  
    
0.054* 0.032  0.047  0.032  
DEBTR 0.164* 0.085  -0.107  0.054  
    
-0.043  0.066  -0.056  0.058  
AGE -0.171** 0.078  -0.214*** 0.046  
    
-0.135*** 0.055  -0.263*** 0.053  
IND -0.133  1.297  0.661  0.734  
    
-2.591*** 0.999  1.016  0.777  
Constant -0.262  0.346  -1.046*** 0.208  
    









R2 0.05  
 
0.08  





LM test for no threshold 37.45 14.71 25.06 
Bootstrap P-value 0.00 0.26 0.00 
a P-values for LM-statistics are from repeating the bootstrap procedures 1,000 times for each of the bootstrap tests. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 














Estimated threshold - 0.061 6.216 
Critical mass/saturation level - Saturation level Saturation level 
Variable 
Below threshold Over threshold Below threshold Over threshold Below threshold Over threshold 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
R&D investment 
    
2.768** 1.365  0.105  0.164  0.084** 0.040  0.308  0.320  
SIZE 
    
0.150*** 0.057  0.116*** 0.047  0.036  0.035  -0.560  0.369  
DEBTR 
    
0.186* 0.103  -0.328*** 0.122  -0.097  0.082  -0.297  0.329  
AGE 
    
-0.110  0.091  -0.053  0.100  -0.173*** 0.062  2.040*** 0.350  
IND 
    
1.156  1.720  1.967  1.603  0.974  1.174  -105.593*** 35.415  
Constant 
    
-1.075*** 0.458  -0.448  0.379  -0.320  0.251  6.024** 3.064  
Observations 



















LM test for no threshold 15.58 22.27 18.19 
Bootstrap P-value 0.14 0.00 0.00 
a P-values for LM-statistics are from repeating the bootstrap procedures 1,000 times for each of the bootstrap tests. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 




Table 13. Empirical results for profit ratio in high-tech firmsa 







Estimated threshold 0.047 0.088 5.587 
Critical mass/saturation level Saturation level Saturation level - 
Variable 
Below threshold Over threshold Below threshold Over threshold Below threshold Over threshold 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
R&D investment 1.133*** 0.283  0.409*** 0.073  0.492** 0.235  0.083*** 0.022  0.005  0.010  -0.021  0.016  
SIZE -0.037*** 0.009  -0.020** 0.009  -0.027** 0.012  -0.044*** 0.007  -0.093*** 0.009  -0.053*** 0.012  
DEBTR -0.102*** 0.017  -0.171*** 0.020  -0.116*** 0.025  -0.125*** 0.016  -0.088*** 0.017  -0.172*** 0.020  
AGE 0.024  0.016  -0.021  0.022  0.067*** 0.023  -0.055*** 0.017  -0.028  0.018  -0.056*** 0.020  
IND -0.643*** 0.250  -0.445* 0.248  -1.314*** 0.371  -0.121  0.203  -0.252  0.250  -0.969*** 0.249  

























LM test for no threshold 27.95 44.44 30.55 
Bootstrap P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
a P-values for LM-statistics are from repeating the bootstrap procedures 1,000 times for each of the bootstrap tests. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 






Table 14. Empirical results for profit ratio in low-tech firmsa 







Estimated threshold 0.082 - - 
Critical mass/saturation level Saturation level - - 
Variable 
Below threshold Over threshold Below threshold Over threshold Below threshold Over threshold 
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
R&D investment 1.548*** 0.512  0.235  0.143  
        
SIZE -0.009  0.013  -0.002  0.023  
        
DEBTR -0.107*** 0.026  -0.284*** 0.039  
        
AGE -0.061*** 0.025  -0.034  0.043  
        
IND -0.254  0.464  0.372  0.879  
        
Constant 0.360*** 0.103  0.414** 0.184  




         
R2 0.15  
 
0.28  
         
LM test for no threshold 25.02 9.31 14.95 
Bootstrap P-value 0.00 0.73 0.14 
a P-values for LM-statistics are from repeating the bootstrap procedures 1,000 times for each of the bootstrap tests. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 




Next, the coefficients of R&D investment are used in order to classify the threshold 
values into the critical mass and saturation levels. This study defines the critical mass as 
the coefficient of R&D investment when R&D investment is larger than the threshold 
value (“over threshold” group, O group) is significantly positive and the coefficient of 
R&D investment when R&D investment is smaller than the threshold value (“below 
threshold” group, B group) is insignificant. This definition suggests that R&D 
performance significantly increases as R&D investment rises when the amount of R&D 
investment is above the critical mass. 
This study defines saturation level as follows. First, the significantly positive 
coefficient of R&D investment in the B group is bigger than the significant coefficient of 
R&D investment in the O group. This means that the growth rate of R&D performance 
decreases. Second, the coefficient of R&D investment in the B group is significantly 
positive, while that in the O group is not significant, which indicates that the growth rate 
of R&D performance has disappeared. 
With respect to patent applications in high-tech firms, Models 1 and 3 show the 
critical mass exists. These models indicate that R&D performance clearly increases at the 
point which R&D intensity attains 1.4 % or R&D expenditure reaches approximately 300 
million KRW4(see Figure 7). In other words, if R&D intensity (or R&D expenditure) is 
below 1.4% (or 300 million KRW), R&D investment is ineffective. By contrast, in low-
tech firms, there is no critical mass for R&D investment, and only the saturation levels in 
Models 5 and 6 exist. If the ratio of researchers to employees is over 6.1% or if R&D 
                                         




expenditure is over 1.6 billion KRW5, R&D investment can be inefficient. 
In summary, when using patents as a proxy of R&D performance, there is a critical 
mass related to financial investment (i.e., R&D intensity and R&D expenditure) in high-
tech industries, whereas there is no critical mass in low-tech industries. These results may 
come from the characteristic differences between high-tech and low-tech industries. Since 
the technological entry barriers and uncertainty in high-tech industries are higher than 
that in low-tech industries, higher costs must be incurred to achieve a R&D performance. 
 
 
Figure 7. Critical mass for patent 
 
In terms of gross profit ratio, only saturation levels are measured in Models 7, 8 and 
10. For high-tech firms, if R&D intensity is over 4.7% (Figure 8) or the researchers to 
employees ratio is over 8.8%, growth rate of R&D performance decreases. With respect 
to low-tech firms, growth rate of R&D performance sustains until when R&D intensity 
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attains 8.2%. There may be two reasons that the critical mass is non-existent for both 
high-tech and low-tech firms. First, technological entry barrier may not have a strong 
effect on profitability. Second, there are more considerations related to profit such as 
business cycle and marketing strategies.  
 




This study empirically investigates the critical mass and saturation levels for R&D 
investment using threshold regression method. The results presented herein are shown to 
differ based upon R&D performance and technological intensity. In terms of patent 
applications, there are critical mass levels for R&D intensity and R&D expenditure in 
high-tech industries, but none in low-tech industries. Critical mass can exist in high-tech 
industries because of high technological entry barriers and high uncertainty. In the case of 
R&D 
performance 
(GPR in 2007) 
R&D investment 






profit performance, however, only the saturation level exists, perhaps because 
technological entry barrier does not have a strong influence on profitability or because 
profitability is influenced by business cycle and marketing strategies. 
Table 15 shows that the ratio is below threshold. Approximately 17% for R&D 
intensity and 30% for R&D expenditure of high-tech firms do not exceed the critical mass 
in terms of patent applications. If those high-tech firms that do not attain the critical mass 
increased their R&D investments to the level of the critical mass, they could accomplish 
much greater R&D performance. Therefore, relevant firms have to make a strategy to 
increase R&D investment. Since SMEs are likely to face difficulties in financing and 
managing R&D investment, the government needs to consider further how to support 
high-tech firms that are below the critical mass, particularly high-tech firms which are 
breaking new ground. Meanwhile, low-tech firms that exceed the saturation level must 
consider formulating R&D strategies that aim to increase efficiency through the 
rearrangement of resources. If the government supports the R&D activities of low-tech 
firms above the saturation level, it needs to contemplate the redistribution of public R&D 
funds in order to increase social R&D performance. 
 

















16.5 - 29.8 - 45.3 95.9 





The extension of this research would be desirable, including considering more 
specific technological characteristics and allowing for cumulative R&D investment and 
other proxies of R&D performance such as sales growth and total factor productivity 
growth. Furthermore, comparison analysis using different time periods and countries 


























Many studies (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Bradley et al., 1984; Hall, 1992; Kochhar, 
1996; Simerly and Li, 2000; Singh and Faircloth, 2005; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Vincente-Lorente, 2001) have pointed out that a higher debt ratio causes firms to invest 
less in R&D. According to them, because R&D investment with high asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and appropriability offers poor collateral to assets, banks tend to be reluctant 
to lend to small firms preferring R&D investment. In addition, highly leveraged firms are 
supposed to invest less in R&D than in other physical assets because a heavier pressure 
from significant principal redemption within a year may make the firms financially 
inflexible and prevent them from sustaining R&D investment.  
Nevertheless, a bank loan has been an important source of funds for firms to sustain 
their growth. Especially for small and medium enterprises (hereafter SMEs), it has served 
as a critical funding source (Berger and Udell, 1998; Meyer, 1998), accounting for over 
90% of new external financial sources (David et al., 2008; Mayer, 1988). As a result, debt 
financing can also be an important source of R&D investment in the real world, 
especially in countries with a bank-oriented financial system such as Korea.  




investment explaining the entire economy because a larger amount of long-term loans can 
encourage more R&D investment while a larger amount of short-term loans can depress 
R&D.  
Based on this finding, this study uncovers two interesting results based on the stage of 
the business cycle as well as technological intensity. First, due to the different 
contributions of long-term and short-term loans to R&D investment, the relation between 
total loans and R&D investment reveals negative and positive direction in high-tech and 
low-tech industries respectively. In high-tech industries, R&D projects face more 
uncertainties and require a longer period from conceptualization to commercialization 
than in low-tech industries. Therefore, high-tech firms are more sensitive to short-term 
loan ratio in sustaining R&D investment even if the increase of long-term loans 
encourages R&D investment. Furthermore, because the negative effect of short-term 
loans on R&D investment is large enough to offset the positive one of long-term loans, 
total loans and R&D investment in high-tech industries show a negative relationship. On 
the other hand, because R&D projects in low-tech industries are usually based on a 
shorter payback period of investment; low-tech firms are relatively less sensitive to short-
term loans. As a result, there are positive relationships between total loans and R&D 
investment in low-tech industries.  
Second, the positive effect of long-term loans on R&D investment shows a counter-
cyclical pattern while the negative effect of short-term loans shows a pro-cyclical pattern. 
This finding may be contrary to the generally accepted idea explaining the positive and 




upturn and downturn, respectively. In an upturn, the firms are less sensitive to the amount 
of short-term loans they hold because they can refinance maturity and extend loan 
maturities. However, an increase in long-term loans can contribute less to R&D 
investment because the firms prefer obtaining loans for investment in physical assets 
rather than in R&D, and they also prefer equity financing for funding R&D projects. On 
the other hand, in times of economic downturn, R&D investment is contracted to a larger 
extent by an increase in short-term loans because the firms are financially inflexible due 
to fewer opportunities to refinance or rollover and they are burdened with paying back 
existing loans. At the same time, they can be incentivized to invest more in R&D as long-
terms loan increase because the firms focus on R&D investment to prepare for a coming 
upturn period.  
This chaper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature regarding 
the relation between loan ratio and R&D investment and suggests theoretical hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the econometric models. Section 4 interprets the results, and the final 










4. 2 Literature reviews 
 
4.2.1 Relationship between R&D investment and debt 
 
There have been two common notions regarding the financing for R&D. First, firms 
prefer internal sources for financing R&D projects because their higher asymmetric 
information and more principal-agent conflicts can cause higher costs of capital as 
compared to the financing of other physical assets (Hall, 1992; Hall and Lerner, 2009; 
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Also, According to Giudici and Paleari (2000) and 
Oakey and Cooper (1991), self-generated profits are the main finance source for 
innovation in firms. Second, firms prefer equity financing to debt financing if they raise 
the funding for R&D externally since the project becomes sizable (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002). 
In financing R&D externally, firms frequently observe that lenders tend to be reluctant 
to fund R&D investment as it is generally based on intangible assets that offer poor 
collateral to the lenders (Williamson, 1988). Even if they succeed in obtaining debts, 
firms experience difficulties in sustaining R&D investment due to the rigidity of debt 
contracts that impairs the financial flexibility of borrowing firms (O’Brien, 2003). In 
addition, debt financing has been considered inappropriate for mitigating the adverse 
selection of lenders and the moral hazard of borrowers because lenders are restrictive in 




R&D projects (Hall, 1992; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Based on these reasons, there is 
substantial empirical evidence of the negative association between debt ratio and R&D 
intensity (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Bradley et al., 1984; Hall, 1992; Kochhar, 1996; 
Simerly and Li, 2000; Singh and Faircloth, 2005; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Vincente-
Lorente, 2001). 
However, there are some studies criticizing the dichotomous conclusion that debt 
financing would be more inappropriate for R&D investment. First, debt financing can be 
useful for R&D investment in specific industries. For example, Chiao (2002) showed that 
debt is a useful resource to finance R&D investment in non-science-based industries 
while not in science-based industries because the latter usually faces higher risks, holds 
more R&D capital stocks, invests proportionately more in R&D, and consequently causes 
higher costs of debt than the former does. Second, relational debt financing can improve a 
firm’s value until the debt ratio approaches a certain level. Only after passing the level 
does the high debt ratio start to increase hazards of bankruptcy of the firms and 
discourages them from investing in R&D. For example, Wang and Thornhill (2010) show 
an inverted U-shaped relation between relational debt ratio and R&D intensity. Finally, 
relational debt finance can be more appropriate than issuance of bonds for encouraging 
R&D investment because it reduces a lot of hazards and uncertainties in carrying out 
R&D by binding lenders and borrowers more closely (David et al., 2008). That is to say, 
banks can support firms of borrowers in retaining their R&D projects by softening the 
terms of debt contract such as refinancing or extending maturities and by providing 




management. Moreover, banks can monitor and guide the firms to prevent them from 
going the wrong way because banks have accumulated proprietary and subjective 
information on client firms for a long time and they sometimes obtain seats on their 
clients’ boards of directors (Diamond, 1984; Diamond, 1991; Fama, 1985).  
Since SMEs are usually owner-managed, the owner/managers often have strong 
incentives to issue external debt rather than external equity in order to keep ownership 
and control of their firms (Berger and Udell, 1998). In particular, the ratio of loan to 
external fund is very large for SMEs in Korea (Table 16).  
 


















2003 73.2 19.4 3.4 0.5 0.5 2.1 0.9 
2004 72.7 19.8 3.3 0.6 0.3 3.1 0.2 
2005 72.2 22.7 2.8 0.0 0.3 1.3 0.8 
2006 71.9 24.8 1.5 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.2 
2007 74.3 21.7 2.1 0.0 0.4 1.2 0.2 
Source: Small & Medium Business Administration database (http://stat2.smba.go.kr/dbsearch_re_01.jsp) 
 
According to Canepa and Stoneman (2003), Giudici and Paleari (2000), and Oakey 
and Cooper (1991), self-generated profits are the main finance source for firms. 6 
However, Canepa and Stoneman (2003) insist that bank finance makes an important role 
for innovation. Furthermore, Giudici and Paleari (2000) show that bank loan including 
                                         





bank overdrafts and commercial credit are more frequently employed in the earlier-
development stage (Table 17). 
In addition, KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) in Germany and ICO (Instituto de 
Crédito Oficial) in Spain offer long-term loans with maturity form four to fifteen years to 
SME for investing in R&D (NEFI, 2005). In Korea, public credit guarantee institutions 
such as Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KTFC) support banks to offer long-term 
loan to SMEs, encouraging them to invest in long-term R&D.  
In sum, self-generated profits are the most important source for R&D investment 
generally. However, loan, especially long-term loan, is also crucial financing source for 
R&D investment. Furthermore, the influence of loan can be different upon technological 
intensity and business cycle. 
 
Table 17. Importance of different sources of finance in the earlier-development stagesa 
 
Industry Mechanics Electronics Information technology 
Self-generated profits 77% 73% 82% 
Entrepreneurs’ personal savings 23% 18% 24% 
Equity capital form existing shareholders 54% 27% 59% 
New individual shareholders 23% 18% 6% 
New corporate shareholders 0% 9% 6% 
VCs or merchant banks 0% 9% 0% 
Short-term credit 77% 45% 53% 
Commercial credit 54% 45% 41% 
Long-term credit 31% 27% 29% 
Long-term facilitated credit 38% 45% 6% 
a The percentages represent the number of firms who attributed the first two ranks in a three point scale, with 
higher score indicating a higher perceived importance of the corresponding source. 





4.2.2 Relationship between R&D investment and loan maturity 
 
Usually, a firm takes a short-term loan with a maturity date within one year to cover any 
operating expenses. Simultaneously, it obtains long-term loans to expand production 
capacity, and pays it back after one year, usually within three or five years. All activities 
for R&D of a firm can be affected by combined effects between short-term and long-term 
loan. 
However, most previous studies do not consider maturity as an important factor in 
deciding on the level of R&D investment. Although a few studies (Aivazian et al., 2005; 
Scherr and Hulburt, 2001) elucidate the relationship between debt maturity and 
investment, they do not focus on loan maturity and R&D investment.  
Since R&D investment has higher uncertainties, more hazards, and requires longer 
payback period of investment from conceptualization to commercialization (Hall, 2002; 
Hall and Lerner, 2009); it must be more sensitive to loan maturity than ordinary 
investment. Consequently, long-term loans can at least contribute to R&D investment. 
Chiao (2002) showed the positive relation between long-term debt ratio and R&D 
investment. In addition, Brealey et al. (2001) advised that matching maturities of assets 
and liabilities is important. In other words, long-term financing with long-term loans can 
be beneficial for R&D as relatively long-lived assets. 
A financially constrained condition of a firm from an increase in short-term loans 




According to financial theory, there are positive as well as negative contributions of 
short-term loans to corporate investment. According to many studies (Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Flannery, 1986; Kale and Noe, 1990; Myers, 1977), the capital structure of firms 
with more opportunity sets for growth holds more short-term loans or debts, and the firms 
with good credit rating prefer raising short-term loans. This is because the increase of 
short-term loans can signal to capital markets that the financial condition of the borrower 
is strong as well as flexible, and that the borrower is about to exercise one of its growth 
options. In addition, because short-term loans can be usually obtained at lower interest 
than long-term loans, they can ensure financial flexibility to the firm allowing it to invest 
in various investment options, including R&D investment.  
On the other hand, the increase in short-term loans causes higher liquidity risks than 
long-term loans do because short-term loans require principal redemption within a year 
(Diamond, 1991). This financial distress can depress R&D investment as well as other 
physical investment, leading a firm to pay more attention to operating expenses. This 
depression would be serious in SMEs that are more cash-starved and more dependent on 
bank loans (García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2007; Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
 
Hypothesis 1a. A firm’s R&D intensity is positively associated with long-term loan ratio. 
Hypothesis 1b. A firm’s R&D intensity is negatively associated with short-term loan ratio.  
 
The combined effect of Hypothesis 1a and 1b can reveal a completely different 





According to Agarwal (1998) and Carpenter and Petersen (2002), as compared to low-
tech industries, the return on investment in high-tech industries is highly uncertain and 
only a few of the projects manage to breakeven. Moreover, there are many asymmetries 
of information because it is quite difficult for players other than banks to access and 
review R&D projects. In addition, the R&D investment in high-tech assets is based on 
low liquidation value because R&D expenditure is used to hire skilled workers such as 
scientists or engineers and purchase the facilities specific to the R&D project (Hall and 
Lerner, 2009). Additionally, because R&D projects in high-tech industries require a 
payback period of over three or five years, an increase in short-term loan ratio makes a 
firm financially inflexible and inhibits long-term investments such as R&D. As a result, 
the impact of liquidity risks on R&D investment must be higher in high-tech industries 
than in low-tech ones. The negative effect of short-term loans in high-tech firms may be 
large enough to offset the positive effect of long-term loans.  
However, R&D projects in low-tech industries show less information asymmetry as 
compared to those in high-tech industries and frequently require a payback period of 
investment (Ettlie et al., 1993). Therefore, even if there is a negative relation between 
short-term loan ratio and R&D investment, it is not big enough to eliminate the positive 
effect of long-term loans on R&D investment.  
 
Hypothesis 2a. R&D intensity of firms in high-tech industries is negatively associated 




Hypothesis 2b. R&D intensity of firms in low-tech industries is positively associated with 
total loan ratio.  
 
There are a few scholarly works focusing on the changes in R&D investment in times 
of economic upturn and downturn, which especially mention that R&D investments show 
a pro-cyclical pattern. For example, Aghion et al. (2008) find that R&D investment 
decreased during a downturn while it did not increase proportionally in an upturn. In 
addition, Bloom (2007) shows that higher uncertainties during downturns caused firms to 
depress R&D investment, especially firms with tight credit constraints. 
The pattern of R&D investment can be explained according to the stage of business 
cycle in terms of short-term and long-term loan ratios: An increase in short-term loan 
ratio can depress R&D investment to a lesser extent during times of economic upturn 
because most of the firms can refinance maturity loans, extend loan maturities easily, and 
so on. At the same time, it is uncertain whether an increase in long-term loan ratio 
activates R&D investment to a larger extent because it leads to investment in the 
expansion of physical facilities, and not in R&D. Instead, R&D projects can be better 
funded from equity markets at relatively low cost without principal redemption in times 
of economic upturn. On the other hand, an increase in short-term loan ratio depresses 
R&D investment to a larger extent during times of economic downturn because the firms 
tend to keep them on their losses for principal redemption. However, the increase in long-
term loan ratio can contribute more to R&D investment in spite of a downturn because it 




upcoming times of economic upturn. 
Eventually, due to mixed reactions of short-term and long-term loans to R&D 
investment at different stages of the business cycle, there is no clear consensus explaining 
the relation between total loans and R&D investment.  
 
Hypothesis 3a. Relationship between long-term loan ratio and R&D intensity shows a 
counter-cyclical pattern. 
Hypothesis 3b. Relationship between short-term loan ratio and R&D intensity shows a 
pro-cyclical pattern. 
 
Table 18 summarizes the hypotheses in this study.  
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This study applied the random effect model for panel analysis. Because R&D intensity 
differs systematically by industries, the model should include industry dummies to 
control industrial effect on R&D investment. This study cannot select between the fixed 
or the random effect models based on the result of Hausman test because industry 
dummies are perfectly collinear with the constant variables if the fixed effect model is 
applied. In addition, it is known that a random sample is estimated by random effect 
model (Wooldridge, 2003). An alternative is the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
model, a fixed effect model to include dummy variables, that can be applied. However, 




Data are collected mainly from the Korea Enterprise Data (KED) and Korea Investors 
Service (KIS) that are leading corporate credit agencies in Korea. To show the 
relationship between loan ratio and R&D investment clearly, this study focused on 
unlisted SMEs in the manufacturing sector from 2003 until 2007. After deleting outliers 




our final sample consisted of 16,479 SMEs with 41,501 observations. 
The definitions of high-tech and low-tech industries are based on the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guideline. It classifies an industry into 
one of four categories: high technology, medium-high technology, medium-low 
technology, and low technology based on technological intensity indicators such as R&D 
expenditures divided by value added or sales by industries (Criscuolo and Martin, 2004). 
The OECD classification is reduced to two industries: high-tech industry7 and low-tech 
industry 8 . As a result, the number of firms in high-tech (low-tech) industries is 
10,144(6,335) with 27,057(14,444) observations.  
The definitions of economic upturn and downturn are based on the growth rate of 
GDP and bank loans outstanding in Korea (Table 19). During the 2000s, the Korean 
economy has shown fluctuations. In spite of the collapse of the IT bubble in 2000, the 
Korean economy recovered at a fast pace during 2001 and 2002. However, the expansion 
of credit card companies caused serious defaulting on credit card debt and the domestic 
economy was in a depression until 2005. From 2006, the economy recovered as export 
markets expanded, especially due to the fast growth of the Asian and BRICS economies 
and this continued until the global crisis in 2008. This paper classifies the period between 
2003 and 2005 as an economic downturn and the period between 2006 and 2007 as an 
upturn.  
                                         
7  Chemicals and chemical products; Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations; 
Computer, electronic and network products; Medical, precision, optical and watch products; Electrical 
equipment; Machinery and equipment; Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Other transport equipment 
8 Food products; Beverages; Tobacco products; Textiles; Wearing apparel; Leather and related products; 
Wood and of products of wood and cork except furniture; Paper and paper products; Printing and 
reproduction of recorded media; Coke and refined petroleum products; Rubber and plastics products; Other 
non-metallic mineral products; Basic metals; Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment; 






Table 19. Growth of GDP and bank loans in Korea (%) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Growth of GDP 7.2 2.8 4.6 4.0 5.2 5.1 2.3 0.3 
Growth of bank 
loan 
24.8 14.1 1.7 6.6 14.5 24.6 20.1 2.9 




The dependent variable R&D intensity (R&D) was calculated by dividing R&D 
expenditures by total sales. Numerous studies (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Hitt et al., 
1991; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Wang and Thornhill, 2010) have measured R&D 
intensity based on the above definition. In this study, six factors are assumed to affect 
R&D intensity. The first determinant is the size of firm (SIZE) measured by the logarithm 
value of total assets. The second is return on asset (ROA) as a proxy for free cash flow or 
internally reserved fund in the firm. To measure free cash flow or internally reserved fund, 
the statement of cash flow should be investigated. However, while credit rating agencies, 
the data source of this study, collect balance sheet and profit/loss statements of SMEs, the 
cash flow statements could only be collected from 10% of the sample SMEs.. Mainly, the 
relationship between cash flow and R&D investment has been known to be positive 
because of capital market imperfections (Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). 




opposite evidence that there can be a negative relationship between them because 
corporate managers tend to take more risk-averse stance as their firms perform well. The 
third captures the growth of a firm (GROWTH), measured by the growth of total assets. 
In general, a fast-growing firm tends to invest actively in R&D investment (Balakrishnan 
and Fox, 1993; Ogawa, 2007; Titman and Wessels, 1988).The fourth and the fifth are 
industrial dummies based on the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and 
year dummies. Finally, the primary variables in this study are the loan ratios consisting of 
total loan ratio (TTLR), short-term loan ratio (STLR), and long-term loan ratio (LTLR). 
They are proxies for financial constraints of SMEs. Table 20 presents the definitions  
 
Table 20. Definition of variables 
 
Variables Definition 
R&D R&D Intensity R&D expenditureit/Net Salesit 
SIZE Firm size Log10 (Total Assets
a
it)  
ROA ROA Net Incomeit/Total Assetsit 
GROWTH Firm growth (Total Assetsait/Total Assets
a
it-1)-1 










Short-term Loanbit/Total Assetsit 
a Adjusted by GDP deflator 
b Including ‘Current portion of Long-term Loan’ and Current portion of Long-term Loan-Foreign Currencies’ 
 











Here, LRit means the loan ratio of firm i at year t consisting of total (TTLR), long-term 




Table 21 shows the descriptive statistics pertaining to the main variables in the model 
and the bivariate correlations between them. As expected, the firms in high-tech 
industries show R&D intensity (5.3%) and growth rate (22.6%) higher than 3.0% and 
17.3% of R&D-performing firms in low-tech industries, respectively. In addition, high-
tech firms show the ratio of bank loans to total assets (36.7%) slightly lower than that of 
low-tech firms (41.5%). Especially, short-term loan accounts for approximately 50% of 
total loan in both high-tech and low-tech firms. This implies that the financial constraints 
from short-term loans influence the SMEs’ decision of investment in R&D. In terms of 
the correlation between variables, total loan ratio and R&D intensity show positive 
correlation, although it is weakly significant with a value of 0.02.Long-term loan ratio 
and R&D intensity are positively correlated while short-term loan ratio and R&D 
intensity are negatively correlated in both high-tech and low-tech industries. 
Table 22 describes the trend of R&D intensity and loan ratio over time. Remarkably, 
exceeding the short-term loan ratio, the long-term loan ratio increased sharply from 2006 
that was treated as the beginning year of economic upturn in this study. During the same 
period, R&D intensity also increased from 4.3% in 2003 to 4.7% in 2006 and 4.8% in 
2007. This implies that the correlation between long-term loan ratio and R&D intensity 
may be positive. On the other hand, short-term loan ratio reduced from 19.9% in 2003 to 
18.9% during the economic downturn in 2005 and reversed to an increase to 19.7% 






Table 21. Descriptive statisticsa. 
  Variables   
Variables 
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Whole 
N=41,501 
1. R&D 0.045  0.080              
2. SIZE 6.680  0.496  -0.19  
     
3. ROA 0.046  0.093  -0.14  -0.13  
    
4. GROWTH 0.207  0.405  0.06  -0.05  0.18  
   
5. TTLR 0.383  0.198  0.02  -0.10  -0.24  0.06  
  
6. LTLR 0.188  0.185  0.07  -0.24  -0.05  0.13  0.58  
 
7. STLR 0.195  0.175  -0.06  0.14  -0.22  -0.06  0.51  -0.40  
High-tech 
N=27,057 
1. R&D 0.053  0.088  
      
2. SIZE 6.667  0.499  -0.18  
     
3. ROA 0.046  0.102  -0.17  -0.13  
    
4. GROWTH 0.226  0.426  0.04  -0.04  0.19  
   
5. TTLR 0.367  0.196  0.02  -0.10  -0.23  0.06  
  
6. LTLR 0.182  0.180  0.07  -0.23  -0.05  0.13  0.60  
 
7. STLR 0.185  0.170  -0.05  0.12  -0.22  -0.06  0.52  -0.37  
Low-tech 
N=14,444 
1. R&D 0.030  0.060              
2. SIZE 6.705  0.491  -0.23  
     
3. ROA 0.045  0.073  -0.05  -0.15  
    
4. GROWTH 0.173  0.359  0.08  -0.05  0.14  
   
5. TTLR 0.415  0.196  0.07  -0.11  -0.28  0.10  
  
6. LTLR 0.200  0.193  0.12  -0.26  -0.06  0.15  0.56  
 
7. STLR 0.214  0.183  -0.06  0.16  -0.24  -0.06  0.48  -0.46  
aAll correlations with an absolute value greater than .02 are significant at p < .01 
 
Table 22. Trend of R&D intensity and loan ratio (%). 
Year R&D 
Total loan ratio 
(TTLR) 
Long-term loan ratio 
(LTLR) 
Short-term loan ratio 
(STLR) 
2003 4.3 37.2 17.4 19.9 
2004 4.2 37.5 17.6 20.0 
2005 4.2 36.7 17.8 18.9 
2006 4.7 38.6 19.4 19.1 
2007 4.8 40.4 20.7 19.7 




Since R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expenditure to net sales, relative growth rate 
difference between R&D expenditure and net sales can affect fluctuation of R&D 
intensity. In particular, since net sales tend to increase rapidly during economic upturn, 
R&D intensity seems to decrease. To confirm, the growth rate of R&D expenditure and 
net sales is calculated (Table 23). During economic upturn, the growth rate of R&D 
expenditure is larger than that of net sales. 
 
 
 Table 23. Growth rate of R&D expenditure and net sales  
Year 
High-tech Low-tech 













2003 298 - 13,014 - 145 - 14,636 - 
2004 313 5.0 13,177 1.3 143 -1.0 14,360 -1.9 
2005 296 -5.5 11,835 -10.2 146 1.8 12,852 -10.5 
2006 303 2.2 11,611 -1.9 165 12.8 12,489 -2.8 
2007 322 6.5 11,778 1.4 184 11.9 12,902 3.3 








Table 24 provides the results of the three regression models about the effect of loan ratio 
on R&D intensity. First, the estimates of the variables SIZE, ROA, and GROWTH show 
the uniqueness of Korean SMEs regarding the determinants for R&D investment. The 
negative, negative, and positive estimates of SIZE, ROA, and GROWTH respectively, 
imply that large SMEs tend to invest less in R&D, and a profitable SME is risk-averse 
even if a fast growing SME invests more in R&D. That is to say, these findings imply that 
large and mature SMEs with stable profit tend to settle for the status quo (Fiegenbaum 
and Thomas, 1988; Hitt et al., 1991).  
Model 1 in the first column shows that there is no clear relationship between total loan 
ratio and R&D intensity, unlike the generally accepted idea. This is because the effects of 
long-term and short-term loan ratios in opposite directions dilute the effect of total loan 
ratio. Model 2 and Model 3 in the second and third column suggest that there is a positive 
association between long-term loan ratio and R&D intensity while a negative association 
between short-term loan ratio and R&D intensity. Usually, because a firm takes on a long-
term loan with a three-year grace period and a redemption period of five years or more, 
an increase in long-term loans encourages a firm to invest more in R&D even if R&D 
investment includes high uncertainties and risks and requires a long payback period of 
investment. The public credit guarantee institutions in Korea can especially contribute 
strongly to the positive correlation between long-term loans and R&D intensity by 




in short-term loans causes high liquidity risks, and financially constrained SMEs 
consequently depress R&D investment. On comparing Model 3 with Model 2, the 
negative effect of short-term loans countervails the positive effect of long-term loans on 
R&D investment. As a result, Table 24 supports Hypothesis 1b as well as Hypothesis 1a.  
 
 










-0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 
-0.127*** -0.123*** -0.131*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
GROWTH 
0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
TTLR 
-0.004   










0.239*** 0.228*** 0.236*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
N 41,501 41,501 41,501 
x2 3000 3027 3061 
aThe standard errors are shown in parentheses. The significance is shown for two-tailed t-tests at the 99% 
(***), 95% (**), and 90% (*) significance levels. 





In Table 25, the positive and negative effects of long-term and short-term loan ratios 
on R&D intensity generate different results of the total loans’ effect on R&D intensity in 
high-tech and low-tech industries. In high-tech industries, long-term loans show positive 
relation with R&D investment in Model 4, and short-term loans show negative relation in 
Model 5. These findings are consistent with the results in Table 4. However, as the 
negative sensitivity (-0.024) of short-term loan ratio to R&D intensity is greater than the 
positive sensitivity (0.015) of long-term loan ratio, these results make the association 
between total loan ratio and R&D intensity positive in Model6. On the contrary, a 
different result is obtained in low-tech industries. In Model 7 and Model 8, the effects of 
long-term and short-term loans on R&D investment are positive and negative, 
respectively, similar with the result in high-tech industries. However, low-tech industries 
show that the positive sensitivity (0.012) of long-term loan ratio is greater than the 
negative sensitivity (-0.008) of short-term loan ratio to R&D intensity. As a result, their 
combined effect in terms of the total loan ratio on R&D intensity is positive in Model 9, 
showing a completely different pattern from the result of high-tech industries. 
These results are based on different characteristics of R&D projects in high-tech and 
low-tech industries. Because the R&D projects in high-tech industries usually include 
higher uncertainties commercially as well as technically, and require longer payback 
period of investment compared to ones in low-tech industries, sustaining the investment 
in R&D projects for significant periods is an important factor in the success of projects. 
As a result, the loan portfolio with the increase in short-term loan ratio can cause 




because R&D projects in low-tech industries are relatively less uncertain and are 
completed within one year, they can be less sensitive to the short-term loan ratio. 
Consequently, the positive effect of long-term loans must be more dominating than the 
negative effect of short-term loan ratio on R&D intensity in low-tech industries. 
Therefore, Table 25 supports Hypothesis 2b as well as Hypothesis 2a.  
Table 26 presents the different patterns of the sensitivities of loan ratio to R&D 
intensity across times of economic upturn and downturn. First, according to Model 10 
and Model 11, the increase in long-term loan ratio unexpectedly contributes more in R&D 
investment during a downturn period (0.020) than during an upturn period (0.004), 
showing a counter-cyclical pattern to support Hypothesis 3a. This is because the firms 
tend to focus on the investment in physical assets by obtaining long-term loans and invest 
in R&D projects by raising funds from equity markets in times of economic upturn. On 
the other hand, they strengthen R&D investment for upcoming upturn period because 
they cannot expand physical facilities in time of economic downturn. In terms of short-
term loan ratio, Model 12 and Model 13 show that an increase in the short-term loan ratio 
depresses R&D investment to a larger extent in a downturn (-0.026) than in an upturn (-
0.016), showing a pro-cyclical pattern to support Hypothesis 3b. In an upturn, because 
firms can refinance existing loans and extend loan maturity easily, an increase in short-
term loans can have less impact on R&D investment. As a result, the relationship between 
total loan ratio and R&D intensity can be inconclusive during the time of economic 
downturn (Model 14) even if the negative relationship is shown during the time of 


























-0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 
-0.137*** -0.147*** -0.143*** -0.061*** -0.068*** -0.061*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
GROWTH 
0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 




 0.012***   
(0.003) 
 
 (0.003)   
STLR  
-0.024***   -0.008**  
 
(0.003)   (0.003)  
TTLR   
-0.006**   0.005*** 
  
(0.003)   (0.003) 
CONSTANT 
0.232*** 0.241*** 0.245*** 0.215*** 0.223*** 0.220*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
N 27,057 27,057 27,057 14,444 14,444 14,444 
x2 1811  1846  1797  666  656  652  
aThe standard errors are shown in parentheses. The significance is shown for two-tailed t-tests at the 99% 
(***), 95% (**), and 90% (*) significance levels. 




Table 26. GLS random effects regression analysis of long-term and short-term loan ratio 
















-0.029*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.032*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 
-0.136*** -0.117*** -0.148*** -0.124*** -0.143*** -0.124*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GROWTH 
0.010*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LTLR 
0.020*** 0.004*     
(0.004) (0.003)     
STLR 
  -0.026*** -0.016***   
  (0.004) (0.003)   
TTLR 
    -0.005 -0.010*** 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
CONSTANT 
0.215*** 0.263*** 0.230*** 0.265*** 0.234*** 0.273*** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
N 20755 20746 20755 20746 20755 20746 
x2 1875  1790  1904  1816  1843  1801  
aThe standard errors are shown in parentheses. The significance is shown for two-tailed t-tests at the 99% 
(***), 95% (**), and 90% (*) significance levels. 









Loans have been denigrated as inappropriate instruments for financing R&D projects 
because of their rigid contracts that cause financial inflexibility. However, this study 
shows that the relation between loan ratio and R&D intensity depends on loan maturity. 
That is to say, R&D intensity is positively correlated with long-term loan ratio and 
negatively with short-term loan ratio.  
According to the results, an increase in the short-term loan ratio depresses R&D 
investment more, especially in the high-tech industry and during times of economic 
upturn. This result implies that it must be important for firms to manage the maturities of 
loans in their portfolio in order to sustain R&D investment for any projects at any time.  
Long-term loans are especially found to play a vital role in increasing investments to 
R&D projects even during times of economic downturn, thereby showing a counter-
cyclical pattern. This finding implies that the supply of long-term loans can sustain R&D 
investment regardless of the stage of the business cycle. In this circumstance, a 
government can play an important role to encourage private financial institutions to offer 
more long-term loans to firms, especially SMEs in bank-oriented countries. 
This study is unique as it sheds light on the positive role of bank loans for R&D 
investment. Further investigation including more evidence from many countries can 










5.1.1 Critical mass and saturation level of R&D investment 
 
In terms of patent applications, there are critical mass levels for R&D intensity and R&D 
expenditure in high-tech firms, while there are saturation levels for the researchers to 
employees ratio and R&D expenditure in low-tech firms. In high-tech industries, critical 
mass can exist because of high technological entry barrier and high uncertainty. In the 
case of profit performance, however, only the saturation level exists, as profit is affected 
by various factors such as marketing as well as R&D. 
Approximately 17–30% of firms in high-tech industries do not exceed the critical 
mass with regard to patent applications. If those high-tech firms below the critical mass 
increased their R&D investments to the level of the critical mass, they could achieve 
greater R&D performance. The government and relevant firms thus need to find solutions 
to increase their R&D investments and improve performance. By contrast, low-tech firms 
that are above the saturation level should consider formulating R&D strategies that aim to 
increase efficiency through the rearrangement of R&D resources. If the government 




contemplate the redistribution of public R&D funds for in order to increase social R&D 
performance. 
 
5.1.2 Relationship between R&D investment and capital 
structure 
 
Loans have been denigrated as inappropriate instruments for financing R&D projects 
because of their rigid contracts that cause financial inflexibility. However, this study 
suggests that there must be no correlation between loan ratio and R&D investment 
explaining the entire economy because a larger amount of long-term loans can encourage 
more R&D investment while a larger amount of short-term loans can depress R&D.  
Based on this finding, this study uncovers draws two interesting results conclusions 
based on the stage of the business cycle as well as on technological intensity. First, since 
the contributions of provided by long-term and short-term loans to R&D investment is 
different, the relation between total loans and R&D investment reveals shows a negative 
and a positive direction in high-tech and low-tech industries, respectively. Second, the 
positive effect of long-term loans on R&D investment shows a counter-cyclical pattern, 
while whereas the negative effect of short-term loans shows a pro-cyclical pattern. 
This result implies that it must be important for firms to manage the maturities of 
loans in their portfolios in order to sustain R&D investment for any projects at any over 
time. Long-term loans are especially found to play a vital role in increasing investments 




showing a counter-cyclical pattern. This finding further implies suggests that the supply 




5.2 Policy implications 
 
Table 27 defines the group based on the critical mass of RINT and REXP in high-tech 
industries. A value of zero means that their RINT or REXP values are below the level of 
the critical mass. The R&D intensity and R&D expenditure of those firms in Group IV 
are above the critical value, whereas Group I is the black list because both intensity and 
expenditure are below the critical mass. Table 28 shows the mean value by group in 2005. 
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Table 28. Mean values by group in 2005  
2005 I II III IV 
DEBTR 0.572 0.508 0.603 0.506 
CLRa 0.424 0.409 0.409 0.363 
NCLRb 0.153 0.099 0.194 0.143 
GOVRc 0.033 0.036 0.113 0.121 
Self-REXPd 5.014 5.757 5.122 5.840 
Gov-REXPe 0.268 1.008 1.361 2.172 
RINT 0.007 0.009 0.071 0.062 
REXP 5.046 5.776 5.191 5.926 
DSR1f 0.068 0.223 1.000 1.000 
DSR2g 0.000 0.968 0.013 0.909 
a CLR: Current liabilities / Total assets, ; b NCLR: Non-current liabilities / Total assets; c GOVR: R&D 
expenditure from government / Total R&D expenditure; d Self-REXP: Log10(Self R&D expenditure +1); 
eGov-REXP: Log10(R&D expenditure from government +1); 
fDSR1(Dummy): 1 if Self R&D expenditure/ 
Net sales > Critical mass (0.0143); g DSR2 (Dummy): 1 if Self-REXP > Critical mass (5.477) 
 
Firms in Group I are found to have relatively high debt ratios. In particular, their 
current liabilities ratio including short-term loans is the highest among the four groups. 
Moreover, RINT and REXP are the lowest, consistent with the results presented in 
Chapter 4. The percentage of self R&D intensity above the critical mass is only 6.8% 
(DSR1) of firms in Group I, while this percentage is zero in self R&D expenditure 
(DSR2). However, the R&D intensity and R&D expenditure of firms in Group IV that 
have lower debt ratios and current liabilities ratios exceed the critical mass. In other 




Nevertheless, government support and expenditure in Group IV is the highest among the 
four groups. Unfortunately, government support for firms in Group I (i.e., those most in 
need) is the lowest. 
Therefore, high-tech firms in Group I need further support from the government as 
well as innovative firm strategies. When managers or policymakers plan for additional 
R&D investment, long-term loan financing can be a good choice, as long-term loan ratio 
has a significantly positive relationship with R&D intensity based on the presented results.  
Equity financing may not be attractive because the equity market in Korea is not 
currently buoyant. However, in the long run equity financing would be helpful. The 
Korea Finance Corporation, established in 2009, establishes SME and venture investment 
funds through contributions, with fund managers making investments in individual 
companies according to the purpose of each fund. Since the number of these funds is 
increasing, equity financing would provide further invigoration. Many governments 
around the world support SMEs through equity funding. According to Hall and Lerner 
(2009), US Small Business Investment Company and Small Business Innovation 
Research programs disburse venture funding. In Germany, over 800 federal and state 
government financing programs have been established, while the UK has created 








5.3 Contributions and limitations 
 
This research measures the critical mass and saturation levels of R&D investment. Based 
on the presented results, firms and the government can formulate a plan to increase R&D 
performance and efficiency. Further, this study shows that the relation between loan ratio 
and R&D intensity depends on loan maturity, technological intensity, and business cycle. 
This finding sheds light on the positive role of bank loans for R&D investment.  
Combined information on how much to invest and on how to pay is useful for making 
accurate R&D investment and financing decisions. Adding these combined results to 
information on which asset to buy would make the result even more influential. 
The following points should be considered in further studies: the econometric 
improvement of threshold regression in order to make estimates using fewer observations; 
analysis using other financing sources such as equity, government funds, and bonds; 
comparison analysis among nations; and an extension to other industries such as services 
and software. In particular, analysis in the software industry would be interesting. Arora 
et al. (2010) find that the change in the IT industry, one of manufacturing industries, is 
systematic, substantial, and increasingly dependent on the software industry. Therefore, 
analysis in Korea software industry, especially mobile software industry such as Apple 
App store which is becoming even more crucial, is very helpful for Korean IT firms 
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본 연구  목  연구 개  자  에 한 결 이 연구 개  동에 
미 는 향  히는 것이다. 존 자 이 에 르면, 어떤 자산  살 것인
지  얼마만큼 자할 것인지를 결 하는 자 결 과 그 자산   
어떻게 지불할 것인지를 결 하는  결 이 업 자에 있어 요한  
가지 결  사항이다.  
연구 개  자 결 과 해 , 자 상에 해 는 많  연구가 진행
었지만,  자량에 한 연구는  어 움  인해 거  이 지지 
않았다. 근 연구 개  자   에 한 연구들이 이 지만, 자
 과간  시차에 한 고 가 이 지지 않았다. 연구 개  자   
 (  포 ) 뿐만 아니라 연구 개  과 증가를 해 필요한 소한
 자량  미하는 임계 도 연구 개  자 결 에 있어 요한 고 사항
이다. 그러나 많  학자들이 임계  존재  요 에 해 언 하 에도 
불구하고 임계   이 지지 않았다. 
연구 개   결 과 해 , 많  연구들이 부채 이 높  회사들
 연구 개  자를 이는 경향이 있다고 지 하 다. 그러나 근 연구들
에 르면, 부채  연구 개  자  계는  집 도  부채  종 에 
라 달라질  있다. 특히 채권과 달리 출  연구 개  자  자산 특이




(正)   갖게 다. 그러나 출과 연구 개  계를 다룬 존  
연구들  계에 요한 향  미   있는 출 만 ,  집 도, 경
(景氣)를 고 하지 않았다.  
라  본 연구에 는 첫째, 학자  책 입안자들  심이 날  높아지
고 있는 소 조업체 연구 개  자  임계 과 포  실증  
하 다. 횡단면 한계 추 법  이용하여  가지 값  추 하 며, 추  
결과는 연구 개  과   집 도에 라 다르게 나타난다. 특허 과  
해 , 하이 크 산업에 는 연구개  집약도  연구개  지출에 있어 임
계 이 었 나, 크 산업에 는 임계 이 지 않았다. 그 이
는 크 산업  하이 크 산업  높  불 실 ,  진입장벽 인 
것  보인다. 이익 과 해 , 하이 크 산업과 크 산업 모 에  
포  만이 었다.  
째, 출 만 ,  집 도, 경 상황  고 하여 소 조업체  출 
이 연구개  동에 미 는 향  조사하 다. 분  결과에 르면, 연구
개  집약도는 각각 장  출 과는 (正)  계를, 단  출 과는 
부(負)  계를 갖는다. 한 경  하강 에 그리고 하이 크 업들이 단  
출  증가 시 연구 개  자를  이는 경향  보인다.  
째, 앞  분 한 결과들  토  소 업 연구 개  자  과  효
 높일  있는 책과 략  안하 다. 임계 보다  양  자




자를 늘  임계 에 도달하는 법  좋  택이   있다. 장 는 
자본 자도 좋  안이   있다. 
리하면, 본 연구는 연구 개  자  임계 과 포   통해 소
업  연구 개  자 결 이 연구 개  과에 미 는 향과 출 과 
연구개  집약도 사이  계 분  통해 자본 구조에 한 결 이 연구 개
 자에 미 는 향  보여주었다. 그리고 이를 탕  연구 개  자
 과  효  높일  있는 복합 인 결  안  시하 다.  
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